A worker can choose high (H) or low (L) effort. If the worker chooses high effort, she incurs a personal cost of 1. In this case, output is high with probability one. If the worker chooses low effort, she incurs a personal cost of 0. In this case, output is low with probability one. When output is high, the firm receives revenue of O and zero otherwise. Can the same outcome be achieved when effort is unobservable?

A. Yes, because the firm would find it wothwhile to pay the bonus for high effort.

B. No, because for any bonus offered, the worker will claim to have exerted high effort.

C. No, because the firm has to pay the bonus based on output.

D. Yes, because effort can be perfectly inferred from output, which is observable.

B. No, because for any bonus offered, the worker will claim to have exerted high effort.

Explanation:

This question required some basic reasoning about how human beings function. We all like to receive things from others, and if they are free (or without cost or effort) the more we like them. And we all believe that good things should happen to us and that we are entitled to receive good things. That is the basic reason why jealousy and envy exist.

Now, back to our case. If the company simply hands out bonuses to everyone regardless of their personal effort, every single worker will be convinced that they really deserve the bonus. Even if the worker didn't even try to do his best or didn't do anything right at all, he/she will be convinced that they deserve the bonus. Each and every single worker will claim that the reason they are receiving the bonus is due to their work. Everyone will say that they worked hard and their work was good.

Imagine this happened at school. One day, the teacher decides to give As to half the class in alphabetical order (or any other random way). The half that got the As will believe that they deserved the As while the other half will be very unhappy. If everyone got As, then everyone will be convinced that thy got As because they deserved them.