Consider the voluntary contribution to building a fence game discussed in class. Assume that v1 = v2=100 and C=150, and select all that apply.
a. Each player donating 100 is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the game.
b. Contributing more than her own valuation is a strictly dominated strategy for each player.
c. It is efficient to build the fence.
d. There are Nash equilibria in which the fence is not built.
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Home » Business » Consider the voluntary contribution to building a fence game discussed in class. Assume that v1 = v2=100 and C=150, and select all that apply. a. Each player donating 100 is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the game. b.